Response to David Zeidan and Tawfik Hamid
by
A. David Zeidan’s Response published on Fulcrum
First of all, I would like to thank David for taking the time to critically engage with my review, with a serious and considered response. The tone of the piece, respectful yet pulling no punches in terms of areas of disagreement, is to be welcomed. My reply will mainly be a series of specific responses to points raised by David, followed by some concluding remarks, and a note about Tawfik Hamid’s comments.
Some specific points
NB – quotations from David’s reply are italicised, quotations from my original review are in bold.
“The focus given to the person and activities of the author of the book is unusual if not necessarily excessive”
I must confess that I find this a strange thing to say. I specifically talk about Sookhdeo and his activities in two initial paragraphs, by way of establishing the background and identity of the book’s author for those who might not be familiar with him. This is pretty standard practice for a book review. In fact, in terms of a word count, the information about Sookhdeo forms 3 percent of the whole review. I honestly can’t see how this could constitute an “unusual” or “excessive” focus.
“an imputation of guilt by association...the approval of these people cannot rightly be used as a ground for criticising the text”
Again, mentioning who has endorsed the book is quite common in a book review, as part of providing some context. It’s not to do with ‘guilt by association’, and nor do I use these endorsements as “ground for criticising the text”.
“A similar point might be made about White’s critique of Sookhdeo’s use of material from pro-Israeli groups, specifically Palestinian Media Watch and the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Like all sources, these should be assessed with care and due reference to the authors’ presuppositions, but their link to Israel should not in itself call their testimony into question, especially since MEMRI’s translations of Arabic documents are widely recognised to be among the best available.”
Firstly, Zeidan himself recognises that MEMRI and PMW do not simply have a “link to
Out of the six listed staff members, three used to work for ‘Intelligence’ in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The co-founder, Yigal Carmon, was in the IDF’s intelligence branch for 20 years, and also advised Israeli Prime Ministers. MEMRI’s other co-founder, Meyrav Wurmser, served on a committee that helped draft a key policy paper for Netanyahu in 1996.2
Other content removed from MEMRI’s ‘About’ page includes a description of how “in its research, the institute puts emphasizes the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of
Vincent Cannistraro, who worked in the CIA for 27 years, as well serving on the US National Security Council, said of MEMRI that “they are selective and act as propagandists for their political point of view, which is the extreme-right of Likud”
Apart from the political agenda and problem of selectivity, there are also sometimes questions about the accuracy of translations. In one particular case, MEMRI’s Carmon defended the organisation by taking issue with CNN’s Arabic department as well as Arabic grammar books (I actually linked to this story in my review’s footnotes).4
Finally, while most of MEMRI’s translations are indeed accurate, they are not the only – or even ‘best’ – option available. There is MideastWire, a service which Marc Lynch,
“White appears to pick out a very few quotes that he judges suitable to establish his claims while ignoring a much larger quantity of material in the book that establishes its thesis. The book in fact contains 1133 references, which include many quotes from Muslim source texts, classical Muslim scholars and modern Muslim scholars and thinkers as well as Islamist and radical Islamist leaders, and which Sookhdeo uses in support of his argument. Yet White mentions only one from what he regards as a dubious source (p196, n531, Randall Price) and one that he says is misquoted (p196, n534, Hamid Enayat).”
An analysis of even a small proportion of all the book’s references would require a book itself; a book review does not typically do this. I specifically point to three areas of the book’s analysis I felt to be problematic, and cite accordingly. In the course of my review, I actually refer to seven different sources and/or quotations used in the book.
“White focuses on a few issues (such as taqiyya) at the expense of the main thrust of Sookhdeo’s book”
At the beginning of the review, I felt I clearly explained the main thrust and thesis of the book. I chose to look at the presentation of taqiyya as one example of what I felt was a flawed or skewed discussion of the relevant Islamic theology (itself one of the three problematic areas I discuss).
“Yet Sookhdeo accepts that local political contexts, as well as a whole gamut of other factors, have some role to play in radicalising Muslims, while arguing that it is their combination with religious motivations that is the catalyst for radicalisation. “Local grievances combined with a strong allegiance to a collective religious identity can lead to instability and conflict.”(p43, italics added). Sookhdeo fully acknowledges (p103) that:
Of course most Muslims would respond that these are mainly liberation struggles and argue, quite rightly, that Muslims have faced varying degrees of discrimination and hostility in many of these contexts.”
After reading the book, I felt that even a cursory consideration, let alone considered analysis, of other factors besides ‘Islam’ were few and far between, lost in the general emphasis I cite in my review, e.g.
According to Sookhdeo, even if one was to ‘eliminate’ every ‘Islamic terrorist’, “sooner or later terrorism would re-emerge, as individual Muslims examined the roots of Islam, gave them a particular interpretation, and made their own decisions to return to the violence of the early days of their faith” (401).
Sookhdeo stresses that the “immediate goal” of “Islamic terrorists” is “to rule the Muslim world according to the strictest forms of Islam” (406) and that “their ultimate global agenda” is “to change all the remaining Dar al-Harb to Dar al-Islam” (406).
“Following the 7/7
I haven’t read Omar’s book, or even the section from which that quotation is taken. I would, however, disagree with the framing of his question, since I don’t believe that the attacks in
“Dislike of
This seems rather unjustified since I don’t think there’s anything in my review to support such a statement.
“Much more space in bin Laden’s discourse is given to expounding his theological stance and his theological justification for his attitudes and actions.”
Obviously, bin Laden has a theological justification for his actions. He also, as quoted, expounds a particular (and nasty) religious ideology. The fact remains, however, that it is geopolitical phenomena which shaped the emergence and development of al-Qaeda.
Graham Fuller, former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, history professor and author, noted in an article for Foreign Policy that for “the al Qaeda hijackers, Islam functioned as a magnifying glass in the sun, collecting these widespread shared common grievances and focusing them into an intense ray, a moment of clarity of action against the foreign invader”.6
Fuller goes on to point out that “peoples who resist foreign oppressors seek banners to propagate and glorify the cause of their struggle” and that “religion” provides the best “rallying point” of all. At the end of his piece, Fuller cautions that while “it may seem sophisticated to seek out passages in the Koran that seem to explain ‘why they hate us’”, to do so “blindly misses the nature of the phenomenon”.
But, at rock bottom, conflict between East and West remains all about the grand historical and geopolitical issues of human history: ethnicity, nationalism, ambition, greed, resources, local leaders, turf, financial gain, power, interventions, and hatred of outsiders, invaders, and imperialists. Faced with timeless issues like these, how could the power of religion not be invoked?
“White suggests that Sookhdeo claims the conflict in Israel/Palestine is essentially a religious one between Muslims and Jews and that there is no possibility of peace. But in the quoted passage (p117) Sookhdeo is actually summarising the view of the Islamist movement Hamas as expressed in the Hamas Charter…”
This is a well-spotted error on my part. I did indeed misread the passage in question.
“To the extent that the Hamas Charter governs the organisation’s actions, it must surely be conceded that the prospects for peace in the region are indeed remote.”
Firstly, I don’t believe it is appropriate to place the emphasis on Hamas (never mind the Hamas Charter) when assessing the “prospects for peace”. The conflict in Palestine/Israel is over 60 years old even if one only dates it back to 1948 (the first Zionist Congress was in 1897). Hamas, by contrast, is an organisation/movement that has been around for little more than 20 years.
Secondly, while some Hamas leaders and supporters are certainly guilty of disgusting anti-semitism, the oft-cited Charter of 1988 was in fact the work of just one person, and, according to leading Hamas expert Khaled Hroub, has since “become largely obsolete”.7 The Charter is thus a small part of even Hamas itself, never mind the entire conflict.
“White denies that the goal of Islamists is to rule the whole world; yet most of them claim this explicitly.”
Here’s what I actually wrote in the review:
Sookhdeo stresses that the “immediate goal” of “Islamic terrorists” is “to rule the Muslim world according to the strictest forms of Islam” (406) and that “their ultimate global agenda” is “to change all the remaining Dar al-Harb to Dar al-Islam” (406).3 This is plainly false, if only because such a gross generalisation lumps together a whole variety of actors fighting for a range of localised reasons and priorities.
Sookhdeo plainly states that “the ultimate goal of Islam” is “a worldwide Islamic government based on shari’a (17).
The first point to make is that one can’t talk about “the goal of Islamists” being to “rule the world”, since Islamism is a varied and complex category, finding expression in a multitude of ways in different contexts. Many, for example, simply wish to persuade their immediate community to follow their own, conservative interpretation of Islam. Other groups that are in some way ‘Islamist’ are actually directly focused on some kind of political/ethnic struggle.
But there is an even more important point here: note that the relevant passages of the book under discussion in my review do not talk about “Islamists”, but rather “Islamic terrorists” and even, “Islam” itself.
“And according to Majid Khadduri, in classical Islam jihad is the way to achieve this world dominion (p98):
The jihad was therefore employed as an instrument both for the universalization of religion and the establishment of an imperial world state. (Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p51).
White also challenges Sookhdeo’s use of the classical Islamic division of the world into the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War and the duty of changing the second into the first. Again, Majid Khadduri has this to say (p101):
Thus the jihad, reflecting the normal war relations existing between Muslims and non-Muslims, was the state’s instrument for transforming the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam. (Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p53).”
It is important to consider Khadduri’s quoted comments in context: he is specifically addressing questions and challenges of statecraft faced by “Muhammad’s early successors” (p.51). Khadduri goes on to comment on how “jihad was not the only legal means of dealing with non-Muslims since peaceful methods (negotiations, arbitration, and treaty making) were applies in regulating the relations of the believers with unbelievers when actual fighting ceased” (p.53). In other words, this sounds like the power relations and politics of any state or empire: ready to either employ violence or negotiate a treaty, in order to protect its interests and strengthen its standing in relation to its neighbours/regional competitors. This is not particularly ‘Islamic’.
“White critiques Sookhdeo’s view that in important respects Islam is different from other religions and cultures.”
I don’t think I ever say Islam is not “different” from other religions: there are obviously similarities and differences. The only applicable passage I can think of in my review is a criticism I make of a tendency to establish clear cut divisions/categories when the reality is more complex:
This is not the only example where Sookhdeo emphasises a ‘West’/‘Islam’ divide, at one point grouping together “Westerners and other non-Muslims” (367), as if a Muslim could never also be a ‘Westerner’. The complex reality of overlapping and intersecting categories, however, is too uncomfortable for fundamentalists of all shades in the self-fulfilling ‘clash of civilisations’.
“He claims that Sookhdeo has cited only one reference for his claim that “[I]n classical Islam Muslims are permitted to lie in certain situations, one of which is war”. But in the chapter “Taqiyya” Sookhdeo offers considerable evidence from the Muslim source texts of Qur’an and Sunni hadith. These are based on Muhammad’s example and teaching, which are compelling for all Muslims.”
Maybe this wasn’t clear, but I was referring to the one source for that particular sentence (Randall Price). I don’t believe that the Qur’anic verses and Hadith cited in this section of ‘Global Jihad’ prove the proposed theory about the purpose and contemporary application of taqiyya, as they are drawn from different contexts and situations.
“White also claims that Sookhdeo has misquoted the Muslim scholar Hamid Enayat on the practice of taqiyya by Sunnis. Enayat, however, refers to the Sunni Egyptian Ahmad Amin, who admitted that “Sunnis too have practiced taqiyah - though with a difference”. (Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought.1982, p61).”
My claim that Enayat was misquoted still stands, though I am perfectly happy to be corrected or hear an explanation for this. As it is, ‘Global Jihad’ contains the following quotation from Enayat’s book:
“taqiyya has ‘in practice become the norm of public behavior among all Muslims – both Sunni and Shi‘a – whenever there is a conflict between faith and expediency’” (Sookhdeo, 196)
But when I looked at Enayat’s book, the text reads like this:
“in practice it [taqiyya] has become the norm of public behavior whenever there is a conflict between faith and expediency” (177, Enayat).
Zeidan has now cited a second quotation from Enayat’s book. But this is decontextualised from the passage it originates from. Here is the relevant passage, discussing the ideas of Ahmad Amin:
“On the Shi’i practice of taqiyyah, much reviled by the Sunnis in the past as well as present, Amin is surprisingly less critical, describing it merely as an expedient method used by the Imams either to ensure the survival of their followers under hostile regimes, or to mobilise them in secrecy for revolts against the Caliphs...More significantly, he admits that the Sunnis too have practised taqiyyah – though with a difference: for them, a Muslim who fears that his life may be in danger because of his faith should do all in his power to migrate to another land; only when this proves impossible should he practise taqiyyah, but strictly ‘to the extent that is necessary’.” pp.44-45
Here we can see that Enayat states how the Sunnis hate taqiyya in the past and present, and, that the limited Sunni practice of taqiyya is based on survival from persecution under hostile regimes, and only to be invoked after migration to another country is impossible.
Some final remarks on taqiyya. It seems there are two questions being considered. One, a debate on its applicability in a Sunni context – and I don't believe that Sookhdeo makes a convincing case for taqiyya being as equally Sunni as it is Shia. The second (and perhaps more crucial) question is the extent to which taqiyya is an appropriate reference point in contemporary political analysis. The problem with the understanding of taqiyya presented in ‘Global Jihad’ is that it can end up casting doubt on any claims made by Muslim leaders or groups:
“Throughout Global Jihad, Sookhdeo reinforces his point: taqiyya “must not be forgotten” (367) and it is “important” (196) – even “essential” (426) – for non-Muslims to “always” bear the practice in mind (426).”
“Sookhdeo asks “how many apparently moderate Muslim leaders are doing the same thing” [practicing taqiyya] (209), leaving it open as to how many, if any, ‘moderate Muslim leaders’ we can actually believe.”
What we actually have in terms of the role of taqiyya in ‘Global Jihad’ is a very specific, Islamic theological concept intended to deal with the reality of persecution, disproportionately and unjustifiably expanded to include the mundane e.g. a terrorist obviously concealing his plans, or public figures saying different things to different audiences.
“White asserts that the Afghan jihad is hardly discussed in Sookhdeo’s book and claims that there is only a brief mention of the
On reflection, I would still stand by my criticism that discussion of the Afghan jihad is unsatisfactorily superficial (four paragraphs), especially given both the book’s size, and the expressed focus on ‘Global Jihad’ (my emphasis). It was, after all, the US/Saudi funded jihad in Soviet-occupied
“White is sceptical about Sookhdeo’s warnings regarding the manipulation of demographics by Islamists. Yet various Muslim leaders and Islamists undoubtedly see the Muslim population explosion and migration as a weapon in the quest for Islamic dominion. The following quotes clarify the way at least some Muslims think on this issue”
I’m not sure what “the manipulation of demographics by Islamists” means. What I am indeed sceptical about is the claim made in ‘Global Jihad’ that “the (often deliberately) higher birth rate of Muslim communities in the West compared with their host communities” (Sookhdeo, 430) is one of various “methods” being used to work towards some kind of Muslim conquest.
It is instructive that to backup this idea, one needs to rely on the delusional predictions of the likes of Qaddafi or Ansar al-Islam founder Mullah Krekar. These quotations do not “clarify the way at least some Muslims think on this issue” (my emphasis), but are simply examples of risible fantasies.
Some Concluding Remarks
To close, I would like to briefly address the question of the relationship between politics and religion when it comes to so-called ‘Islamic terrorism’ and jihad. Zeidan had the following to say in his response:
“White has relatively little to say about jihad, which is the main thrust of the book. While Sookhdeo, and the wide range of Muslim sources and thinkers he quotes, are convinced of the importance of the religious and theological motives of Islamic terrorists and their supporters and sympathisers, White strongly de-emphasises these relative to contemporary politics as motives for Islamic radicalism and terrorism.”
The kinds of Islamist jihadists being discussed in a book like ‘Global Jihad’ are obviously motivated in part by religion, and frame their theoretical and practical approach religiously. Moreover, analysing the political, social-economic causation for Islamist jihadi violence is not to absolve its participants of their own responsibility: there are much better choices to be made than the recourse to a bigoted, reactionary fundamentalism.
In my review, however, I stress the political context because of the extent to which it has been removed or decoupled in the analysis of ‘Global Jihad’ (which was one of three broad categories of critique I offered).
To affirm that the extremist jihadis are somehow reflecting the ‘true Islam’ serves simply to affirm these groups in their own highly problematic, selective interpretation of Islamic scriptures. Ziauddin Sardar, the eloquent Muslim critic of fundamentalism, wrote about the “reductive way the Qur’an and the sayings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad are bandied about” by these jihadists, where “almost anything and everything is justified by quoting individual bits of verses out of context”.8 This process is then ironically paralleled by the kind of analysis which posits the Islamist jihadists as ‘true Islam’.
Finally, thanks again to David for the tone and depth of his criticism. I do, however, believe that his response to my review of ‘Global Jihad’ has not detracted from, or undermined, the main areas of concern I outlined.
B. Tawfik Hamid’s Comments published on Fulcrum
Tawfik Hamid’s part of the Barnabas Fund response published on Fulcrum is much shorter than David Zeidan’s. It also does not offer any substantive criticism of my review (except for the aforementioned taqiyya issue). Hamid’s comments are, however, an enthusiastic endorsement of ‘Global Jihad’, describing it as “one of the greatest books” he’d ever read “in this field”. I confess to not having heard of Hamid before this, and given his emphasis on his past experiences as a “former Jihadist”, I read up about him on the internet. Anyone similarly interested can consult various websites, including his own, www.tawfikhamid.com 9
Footnotes
1 http://web.archive.org/web/19990220054656/www.memri.org/about.html; the founder and director of PMW (a smaller operation), meanwhile, is Itamar Marcus, a resident of the illegal Israeli settlement of Efrat in the Occupied West Bank. He worked for the Israeli government in the 1990s. He also features in ‘Obsession’, a film described as the “work of hysterics” by Atlantic Monthly’s Jeffrey Goldberg (‘The Jewish Extremists Behind ‘Obsession’,
http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/10/the_jewish_extremists_behind_o.php)
2 ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm;
3 ‘No Longer Obscure, Memri Translates the Arab World’, The Forward (Jewish-American weekly newspaper),
4 Brian Whitaker, ‘Arabic under fire’, The Guardian’s Comment is free,
These posts are by guest authors for Fulcrum